

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT EMPLOYMENT IN THEATER ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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OPERATIONS**

by

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ABSTRACT

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By employing strategic guidance, the geographical Combatant Commanders (CCDR) achieve our nation's strategic priorities. They develop plans to engage their regional areas, ranging from peacetime security cooperation activities to full combat to post-reconstruction activities. A critical component of the theater security process involves shaping the regional environment by conducting peacetime engagement activities. As a force provider to the CCDRs, the Army Reserve Components (RC) participate in many exercises and humanitarian operations. Through the formal Program Objective Memorandum process, the services request funds to support the CCDRs theater engagement activities. Although the Active Army is successfully acquiring Operational and Maintenance funds to support these activities, the RCs are underfunded. However, a revision of the Program, Planning, Budget, Execution (PPBE) process will enable the Army RCs to receive adequate funding to assure their continued support of the CCDRs theater engagement activities. This SRP recommends several solutions to this problem as a means of enabling the Army RCs' support to the CCDRs theater security cooperation activities.

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT EMPLOYMENT IN THEATER ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS

Through a systematic process mandated by law, our nation's leaders develop and promulgate national strategic security guidance which is set forth in The National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Together, these three strategic documents provide the framework for the planning and execution of the regional Combatant Commanders' (CCDRs) theater engagement strategy. The CCDRs develop plans and strategies to engage their regional partners in order to accomplish U.S. objectives. These activities range from peacetime engagement, to conflict and post-conflict nation-rebuilding.

The CCDRs employ the capabilities of Army Reserve Component (both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve) units as a means of executing many of their peacetime engagement activities. In order to accomplish these engagement activities, the CCDRs, through the services, submit budget requirements as part of each service's Program Objective Memorandum (POM). These budget submissions identify the total incremental costs associated with the CCDRs engagement priorities. While the services have historically received adequate Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to accomplish these engagement activities, Army RCs' have not received adequate pay and allowance (P&A) funds to support their participation in these activities. This P&A shortage is caused in part by the separation of appropriations within the POM process. However, some alteration of the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) process can correct this deficiency and better enable the RCs' support to the CCDRs.

The Strategic Framework

The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, established the framework for our current process of formulating the nation's strategic guidance. At the request of the Truman administration, Congress passed this act to end the internal turf-battles that complicated the security policy process at the time.¹ The 1947 NSA established the office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as a cabinet level position to preside over the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy.² Additionally, the 1947 NSA established the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and most importantly the National Security Council (NSC).³ In 1949, the Act was amended to further expand the powers of the SECDEF. Prior to this amendment, the SECDEF had only limited ability to orchestrate defense policy. Indeed, the ability of the first SECDEF, James Forrestal, to execute policy was so perplexing that the process drove him from office.⁴

By statute, the NSC consists of the President, Vice President, SECDEF, Secretary of State, and other advisers as required.⁵ The President, with the aid of other members of the NSC, develops the nation's strategic policies. Currently, this guidance is summarized in the National Security Strategy (NSS). This powerful document is a product of:

The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and aims, among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position and a defense posture capable of defeating hostile action.⁶

Sometimes referred to as the nation's grand strategy, the NSS provides a long-term view of our nation's priorities. Grand strategy represents "a country's broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system."⁷ Grand

strategy thus coordinates “all the resources of a nation...towards the attainment of the political object.”⁸ The NSS guidance shapes the nation’s affairs by establishing policy priorities for foreign aid, budgets, intelligence matters, and defense priorities.⁹

Accordingly, President George W. Bush set his priorities for our nation’s security in the 2006 NSS, which covers a broad range of issues related to our national values and interests. Specifically, it designates the strategic objectives to defeat terrorism, build democracy, and to strengthen alliances. This guidance is received by over 20 government leaders who develop their agency’s strategic plans to support the NSS ends.¹⁰ These agencies, frequently working together in an interagency relationship, achieve our nation’s overall strategic priorities. For example, the Secretary of State interpreted the 2006 NSS and developed four supporting foreign policy goals: to protect the U.S. homeland and American citizens; to advance democracy, human rights, and other global interests; to promote international understanding of American values and policies; and to support U.S. diplomats, government officials, and all other personnel at home and abroad who can achieve these goals.¹¹

In similar fashion, the SECDEF implements the defense part of the President’s NSS and promulgates appropriate security guidance throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). The SECDEF formulates this strategic guidance in the national Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS identifies military objectives that are shared with other U.S. government agencies supporting the nation’s goals. The 2005 NDS designates the strategic objectives that support the NSS: secure the U.S. from direct attack; secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen alliances and partnerships; and establish favorable security conditions.¹² The SECDEF also identifies

the four strategic means we will employ to achieve these objectives: assure allies and friends; dissuade potential adversaries; deter aggression and counter coercion; and defeat adversaries.¹³

The Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff (CJCS) serves as the principal military adviser to the President and other members of the NSC. The CJCSs' core functions are to provide strategic direction to the armed forces, to conduct strategic planning and capability assessments, to develop contingency planning guidance, to set program and budget priorities, and to develop training and education doctrine for the joint force.¹⁴

By reframing the NSS and NDS guidance into military terms, the CJCS issues the NMS in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The NMS specifies the military objectives and capabilities required to execute the President's NSS.¹⁵ The 2004 NMS focuses on three primary objectives: to protect the nation, prevent conflict, and to prevail if conflict cannot be prevented. In essence:

The NMS conveys CJCS's message to the joint force on the strategic direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the NSS, [National Strategy for Homeland Security] NSHS, and NDS. It describes the military ways and means that are integrated with, supported by, or used to support other instruments of national power in protecting the United States, preventing conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends.¹⁶

Together, the NSS, NDS, and NMS serve two critical functions. They link strategic ways and means to the resource planning process and they guide planners as they develop strategic plans of action. Conceptually, these strategic documents enable planners to make realistic assessments based upon the strategic guidance as they develop and execute military plans.

Additionally, the CJCS provides CCDRs with guidance and instructions concerning policy, strategy, plans, forces, and resource requirements that support execution of the NSS. The Joint Strategic Planning Process (JSPP) provides the means for the Chairman, in consultation with the JCS and CCDRs, to systematically review the national security environment and assure that their actions support the NSS objectives. Additionally, as part of the overall JSPP, the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) “provides the means to evaluate risks and threats in order to assess the adequacy of current strategy. The JSPS proposes military strategy, forces, and capabilities necessary to achieve our national security objectives in a resource-limited environment.”¹⁷ As a means to provide the CCDRs guidance establishing requirements and apportioning resources focused on near-term capabilities, the CJCS provides the CCDRs the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).¹⁸ So, the NMS provides the overall security and policy guidance from the CJCS and in turn outlines the “strategic direction for the development of the JSCP.”¹⁹

Whereas the NMS focuses on overall objectives required to execute the NSS, the JSCP provides the CCDRs with focused military strategic and operational guidance. This guidance is incorporated into the preparation of campaign plans, operational plans (OPLANS), and security cooperation plans. Moreover, “the JSCP is the link between strategic guidance and the joint operation planning activities and products that accomplish that guidance.”²⁰

The JSCP also provides the CCDRs with regional objectives and designates tasks that achieve these objectives. The JSCP thus implements the guidance in the NMS through execution of CCDRs operational and engagement plans.²¹ The range of

operations included in the JSCP includes peacetime security cooperation activities through strategic nuclear response. The overall role of the JSCP is “to provide CCDR and Service planners with meaningful, necessary guidance balanced between the details needed to conduct coordinated, sustainable peacetime activities and specific contingencies while still allowing commanders flexibility to respond to unanticipated events.”²²

The Combatant Commanders

The CCDRs serve as the executors of our nation’s strategic plans. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) directs an operational chain of command that runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CCDRs.²³ Additionally, the GNA designates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide guidance to the CCDRs who are responsible for:

Providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense. Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans. Advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans. Establishing and maintaining, after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions assigned to the command.²⁴

In addition to guidance provided in the JSCP, the CCDRs are assigned tasks, geographical boundaries, and overall authority from the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).²⁵ The President uses the UCP to specify “high level command arrangements for operational forces on a global basis...[and provide] structure and

organizational philosophies”²⁶ for the CCDRs. CCDRs then develop and plan strategies that integrate “national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military plans (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means)”²⁷ into activities that support the overall national objectives in their region.

Theater Engagement Strategy Development

One of the concepts specified in the strategic planning guidance is the CCDRs requirement to engage in military activities abroad. These activities are a means to shape the global environment to meet our political objectives as well as support a mutually favorable antiterrorism climate abroad. This strategy is designed to prevent conflict and surprise attacks by deterring terrorist aggression. CCDRs accomplish these objectives by using intelligence resources and rotationally deployed military personnel to support their regional objectives and security cooperation activities.

The CCDRs integrate this guidance into their overall theater strategy, which specifies “concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.”²⁸ Theater strategy thus covers a broad spectrum of activities ranging from “peacetime cooperation with other countries, to meeting potential threats through contingency planning...and crisis action planning.”²⁹ In summary;

Theater strategy is an extension of national military strategy tailored to a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). It is both similar and in complementary support to national strategy. A combatant commander’s theater strategy consists of the three elements found in any strategy: theater objectives and strategic end states (ends), which are achieved through the synchronization of integrated strategic concepts (ways), by using theater organization, activities, and plans

employing joint, interagency, and multinational resources (means), and thereby accomplishes national and multinational objectives.³⁰

CCDRs then develop operational and security cooperation plans that propose a full range of operations to “engage other countries, deter unwanted actions, and defend U.S. and friendly nation interests.”³¹ These operations are categorized as operational phases 0 through 5.

Within the phasing model, activities conducted in phases 0 and 1 are identified in the CCDRs peacetime Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) while phases 2 through 5 are outlined in the JSCP directed operation plans.³² The TSCP identifies security cooperation activities and interagency resources required to interact successfully with the region’s nations. The CCDR’s TSCP consists of five elements: a CCDRs strategic assessment, a concept for implementing security cooperation priorities, measures of effectiveness, risk assessment, and resource requirements.³³ These activities “support national goals at the regional level, and enhance military operations by obviating the need for military action, or by preparing the environment for U.S. military intervention, should it be necessary.”³⁴ These plans support interagency efforts by synchronizing “the broader diplomatic, economic, and information activities established by...referencing the NSS and the Department of States’ Strategic Plan.”³⁵

Phase 0 operations address the CCDRs overall theater shaping activities. These peacetime activities are performed to “dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies...and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives.”³⁶ Thereby, the CCDRs achieve peacetime strategy objectives by developing engagement activities intended to “shape the theater security environment in peacetime.”³⁷

In addition to guidance provided by the JSCP, DoD provides the CCDRs peacetime planning guidance in the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) document which designates six categories of peacetime engagement activities: Military contacts; including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs, nation assistance; including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and humanitarian and civic assistance activities, Multinational training, Multinational exercises; including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program, Multinational education for U.S. personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States, and Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.³⁸ These activities are accomplished by employing assigned and rotationally deployed forces.³⁹

In addition to phase 0 shaping activities, phase 1 operations deter adversary action, phase 2 operations seize the initiative and assure friendly freedom of action, phase 3 operations dominate the adversary by achieving full spectrum superiority, and phase 4 operations stabilize the environment by establishing security and restoring services. These phases of operations culminate in phase 5 with the transfer of civil authority to the legitimate government and redeployment of U.S. and friendly forces.⁴⁰

The Theatre Engagement Environment

Thus, the information provided in the UCP and the other strategic guidance documents outlines the CCDRs overall missions and responsibilities.⁴¹ Conforming to this guidance, the CCDRs provide strategic direction to their subordinate service commands. Additionally, this guidance provides the impetus for the planning and

conduct of unified operations. It also focuses on unified operations that engage the interagency operations within the theater.⁴²

This analysis finally addresses the capability of Army RC forces to serve as a force provider to the CCDRs theater engagement shaping activities. Specifically, it focuses on Army RC's contributions to the activities conducted within the CCDRs TSCP or potential phase 0 operations. These phase 0 operations, designated as shaping activities, focus on engagement activities that promote U.S. strategic interests in the region. These activities allow the CCDR to "shape the security environment to protect and promote U.S. interests and regional objectives."⁴³ These activities may focus on deterrence activities which make a potential aggressor reluctant to act. Typically, they also present a forward U.S. presence which demonstrates our commitment and lends credibility to alliances in order to enhance regional stability and, in crisis response, provides the CCDR options to gain quick control of unanticipated and destabilizing situations.⁴⁴ Although these shaping activities may involve elements of combat operations, these activities are mostly non-combative. Moreover, these security cooperation efforts focus on peacetime activities that enable the CCDR to influence or shape the international environment in accord with U.S. interests.⁴⁵ The overall objectives of these peacetime activities are to: Build defense relationships that promote specified U.S. security interests, build allied and friendly military capabilities to conduct self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access as well as en route infrastructure.

Army RC Engagement Capabilities

Army RC forces have played an important role in theater engagement activities as a force provider to the CCDRs for many years. While RC forces have engaged in many types of OCONUS activities in support of CCDRs, the two most prevalent are State Partnership for Peace (SPP) programs and combined exercise operations. Additionally, the CCDRs develop other engagement activities as part of their CCDR initiatives.

Originating as an opportunistic venture after the demise of the Cold War in 1993, the SPP program developed as a spin-off from the European Command (EUCOM) Joint Contact Team Program.⁴⁶ EUCOM realized the opportunity to shape the democratic transition of the former Baltic States, but decided not to engage active U.S. Army soldiers because Russia might view such activity as aggressive. Therefore, EUCOM employed an Army National Guard state team at the request of Latvia to provide information on military assistance to civil authorities, a routine Guard mission. Thus, the SPP program was born.

Today, the SPP program is quite robust - currently 54 state partnerships and 2 bilateral relationships.⁴⁷ The program focuses on Military-to-Military contacts, which includes participation in military exercises, emergency preparedness, disaster response, border security, leadership and NCO development, and peacekeeping operations. Also, Military-to-Civilian programs which include environmental programs, media relations, defense reform, and consequence management. And finally, Civilian-to-Civilian programs which include distance learning networks, economic development, educational exchange programs, and medical programs.⁴⁸

The success of the SPP program lies in no small part to the notion that:

[A]s reservists, guard personnel have full-time civilian careers in addition to their military duties. Thus, while on an exchange program, guard personnel have been able to bring their civilian expertise to the program.⁴⁹

Even though the U.S. Constitution limits the powers to make treaties and appoint ambassadors,⁵⁰ SPP programs uniquely further diplomatic initiatives. The success of SPP programs is widely acknowledged: “States are now implementing U.S. engagement policy [by means of SPP programs] to a select group of strategically important countries...[that play] a significant role in...U.S. foreign policy.”⁵¹

Army RC forces also serve as a CCDRs TSCP enablers by participating in exercises. Annually, the CCDRs develop their training guidance based upon an assessment of their mission requirements.⁵² These training activities are divided into two categories - Service and Joint. Service training enacts both Active Component and Reserve Component service doctrine, along with interoperability requirements identified by the CCDR needed to execute assigned missions.⁵³ Conversely, Joint Training focuses on staff mission activities designed to support operational and tactical requirements. RC capabilities in the CCDRs Area of Responsibility (AOR) engagement activities significantly enhance service-training activities.

At the height of their overseas engagement activities in 2002, the Army National Guard deployed 27,385 soldiers into 64 countries in support of CCDR engagement activities,⁵⁴ including the CJCS exercises. These exercises provide two operational benefits. First, the program contributes greatly to joint, multinational, and combined training. They also provide a unique gateway to strategic access within the CCDRs AORs. Thus, the CJCS program “provides significant political and diplomatic returns. Exercises demonstrate U.S. resolve and capability to project military power anywhere in the world in support of U.S. national interests and commitments to our allies.”⁵⁵

In addition to engagement activities directed by the CJCS, the CCDRs sponsor engagement activities tailored to meet their respective theater engagement requirements. These opportunities are part of the CCDRs Traditional CINC (referred to as CCDR as of April 2002⁵⁶) Activities (TCA) and CINC Initiative Funded (CIF) Activities.⁵⁷ Like CJCS directed activities, TCA and CIF activities enhance engagement opportunities in the following areas: Force training (activities whose primary purpose is to train U.S. forces), contingencies, selected operations, command and control, joint exercises (including activities of participating foreign countries), humanitarian and civic assistance, military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses), and personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.⁵⁸

Resourcing – the PPBS Process

Implementing national strategy is an expensive endeavor. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, the total estimated budgets for the Department of Defense and Department of State are \$728.4 billion.⁵⁹ The authority to expend public funds for the purposes of statesmanship and diplomacy is established as a matter of law in the U.S. Constitution. Article One of the Constitution prescribes that “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.”⁶⁰ Moreover, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”⁶¹ These rules thus establish the framework that strategic leaders must recognize as they

develop strategic plans to carry out the mission of diplomacy. That is, U.S. diplomacy must be conducted in accordance with public law.

Recognizing the need for an orderly process to establish the federal budget led to the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. This act requires the President, not later than April 15th of each year, to submit a “single, consolidated budget proposal for congressional consideration each year”⁶² in order to finance his policy and administrative requirements. Moreover, program managers and bureaucrats annually submit their budget requirements to the President who in turn submits his consolidated budget to the Congress.

The federal government’s instrument to establish its budget is the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). This system originated in the War Production Board in 1942 and in private industry.⁶³ DoD’s objective in the PPBS process is “to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints.”⁶⁴

The PPBS process consolidates the federal government’s financial requirements by grouping them into programs, as opposed to single line items. These programs are aligned in accord with the agencies responsibilities.⁶⁵ In 2003, the SECDEF streamlined the budget decision process in an effort to better link policy objectives and strategies by including the analysis of DoD programs execution. This guidance was promulgated in the 2003 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) number 20, a process which required DoD to formulate 2 year budget cycles, known today as Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE).⁶⁶

As part of the PPBE process, the services submit budget requirements to the SECDEF in their Program Objective Memorandums (POM), which displays the services resource requirements upon program priorities. Starting with the upcoming fiscal year, the services identify their funding requirements for a period of six years. Although POMs are produced biannually, they are reviewed annually to accommodate changes in priorities between budget-year cycles. After POMs have been consolidated at the service levels and then reviewed and approved by the SECDEF, these requirements become the military portion of the President's annual budget submission to the Congress.⁶⁷

Resourcing: Boots on the Ground

By law, the CCDRs carry out the missions assigned to them within their geographic area by employing assigned and allocated forces.⁶⁸ These missions are part of the CCDRs overall theater strategy. The CCDRs identify their required resources to accomplish these missions. These requirements are prioritized, by order of importance in their Integrated Priority List (IPL).

The CCDRs prepare an Integrated Priority List (IPL), which is a succinct statement of key capability gaps that could hinder the performance of assigned missions. This list is prioritized across Service and functional lines and is fiscally constrained. The IPL is submitted to the SecDef, DepSecDef, and the Chairman. The Joint Staff highlights CCDR concerns...to provide analysis, assessments, and recommendations. The highest priority CCDR shortfalls...are reviewed by the 3-Star Programmers.⁶⁹

The CCDRs identify the resource requirements in their IPLs, which are then integrated into the PPBE process on two levels as part of the programming phase of PPBE. First, CCDRs influence the service budget by integrating their requirements into the subordinate service Major Command's (MACOMs) POM submission.⁷⁰ The services

are required to indicate their ability to resource the CCDRs IPL submission as part of their POM submissions. If they are unable to support the IPL request internally, they must provide justification for this short fall. After reviewing the services' POM submissions, the CCDRs may appeal by reclama if they determine their requirement was not adequately supported. These decisions, outlined in the SECDEF's Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), reflect the final approved changes to the POM submissions.⁷¹

The Resource Dilemma

As we have learned, expenditures of public funds are dependent upon Congressional authorizations. That is, Congress must first authorize governmental programs and then appropriate the funds to execute the programs. Funds authorized by Congress that enable the CCDRs to accomplish their theater engagement strategy come in a number of appropriations. Generally, the most common funds used to pay for these activities come in the Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) appropriation. OMA appropriations enable commanders to pay for a wide range of products and services and to support all of their operations. They are typically one of the largest appropriations a military service receives:

[OMA] appropriation includes operation and maintenance of all Army, organizational equipment and facilities; purchasing equipment and supplies; production of audiovisual instructional materials and training aids; operation of service-wide and establishment-wide activities; operation of depots, schools, training (including cost of training civilian employees in the program from which the salaries are payable), recruiting, and programs related to OMA; welfare and morale, information, education, and religious activities; and expenses of courts, boards, and commissions. This appropriation is generally an annual appropriation, available for obligation for one fiscal year only.⁷²

As the CCDRs plan their engagement activities, the combined appropriations associated with the program are consolidated for submission in the service's POM, cited as Management Decision Packages (MDEP). The genius of the POM is that it identifies the financial relationship across appropriations by packaging the fiscal requirements into program MDEPs. So MDEPs associate organizations' and programs' financial requirements across all phases of the PPBE process and measure the effectiveness of a given program's execution.⁷³

Concerning the uses of Army RC forces by the CCDRs, we must consider that the typical RC soldier is funded to perform 15 days of annual training. Additionally, RC soldiers perform one weekend (two days) of inactive duty training per month. Although RC soldiers perform 24 days of inactive duty training (12 weekend drills), they are credited for a full day's pay after only four hours of training. Therefore, they typically receive pay for four days of training on an average weekend drill.⁷⁴

Accordingly, RC soldiers are funded to participate in 15 days annual training that usually occurs close to their home duty station and 24 days of inactive duty training (weekend drill) for a total of 39 funded days per year. However, these 24 days of inactive duty training typically are not available to the CCDR for theater engagement activities because of required RC home-station training events that occur throughout the training year. Therefore, the availability of RC soldiers to participate in CCDR theater engagement activities is limited to their 15 days of annual training.

RC soldiers require additional training days to participate in engagement activities outside of the continental United States (OCONUS). These additional days are required to accommodate their transportation and logistical movements to and from the U.S.

Therefore, RC soldiers typically require 22 annual training days to perform OCONUS missions. These additional seven days of pay are incremental costs to the service. That is, these costs represent an expense above the services base funding level. Additionally, as part of the activity planning process, RC leaders must attend conferences away from their normal duty station. These conferences are not included in the basic 15 days of paid annual training and 24 inactive duty-training days for the RC soldiers.

The service component, through its CCDR, functions as the executive agent for engagement activities. The service components identify the incremental costs associated with these theater engagement activities in several MDEPs. The two most common MDEPs are VJCS (Combined Joint Chief of Staff Exercises) and TROS (Reserve Component Overseas Training).⁷⁵

In 2006, Active Component (AC) Army MACOM executive agents achieved notable success in obtaining OMA funding to support their incremental JCS exercise costs at a rate of 85%.⁷⁶ Additionally, these same exercise sponsors achieved 100%⁷⁷ OMA funding success in MDEP TROS, which provides overseas deployment training funds. However, the Army RCs' were less successful in obtaining incremental training P&A support for their participation in these same CCDR engagement activities. Since these MDEPs do not contain pay and allowance (P&A) appropriations, the RCs' request this funding in MDEP TRST (Reserve Component Sustainment Training).⁷⁸ However, in 2006 the RCs' achieved only 44%⁷⁹ funding approval.

The result of this inequity in funding is that without the associated RC incremental P&A training funds, the OMA funds have limited utility. Moreover, the requirements used

to justify funding levels of these engagement activities are codependent. That is, OMA funds are used primarily to support the personnel on the ground participating in the engagement activity. Therefore, if the quantity of personnel on the ground participating in the engagement activity is less than required due to reduced P&A funding, the matching OMA funds are at risk of improper uses.

Consider the following explanations for this shortfall: First, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a plan to reduce the Army's overall 2006 funding by \$2.4 billion in Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753.⁸⁰ While guidance outlined in PBD 753 budget reductions was vague, it advised the Army to "spread the reduction to any program and appropriation as a means to achieve efficiencies... [and] go after non-core missions."⁸¹ The failure of this mandate is that it did not provide program managers specific instructions to identify funding reductions.

Secondly, the Army has not acknowledged the value of these theater engagement activities. In addition, the results of the engagement activity are not adequately linked to measures of effectiveness in the POM. Whereas strategic planners go to great lengths to identify measures of effectiveness for engagement activities as part of the Army International Activities Plan, they fail to adequately integrate this data into the PPBS process.⁸²

Finally, the requirements for OMA and RC P&A funds are separated in the POM process. These costs are presented to the Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) during the program requirements briefs in the POM process. The Training PEG (TT) then reviews the OMA requirements of both MDEPs VJCS and TROS. However, the Manning PEG (MM) reviews the RC pay and allowance requirements. So, separation of

incremental costs of theater peacetime engagement activities leads to P&A funds receiving unequal validation with the codependent OMA funds.

Recommendations

Planners may pursue several options to meet the Army's requirement to fulfill the requirements of the CCDRs. First, Army planners must link measures of effectiveness to the requirements of their engagement activities in the Army's Data Analysis Query System (DAQS) and PPBE Tools databases. These databases are the systems-of-record for measuring program funding and execution within the Army PPBE process. While CCDR staff planners track engagement activity achievements using a number of database systems, they collectively fail to capture all activities that are not electronically linked to the PPBE process.⁸³ These data base exchanges must link to the MDEP cost fields in the DAQS automation system.

Secondly, planners and resource managers must develop specific MDEPs that are unique to each CCDR and that stand alone from other training MDEPs. These stand-alone MDEPs will enable resource managers to capture all associated costs of these activities within each CCDRs AOR.

Finally, the result of the incremental RC P&A requirements must move from the TRST MDEP to those associated with the CCDRs unique activity MDEPs. This will enable planners to adequately capture and link the full spectrum of costs across all appropriations for each CCDR engagement activity within a single MDEP. Then, the TT peg alone will validate the consolidated OMA and RC P&A requirements in support of the CCDRs IPL submissions.

Conclusion

A systematic process authorized by law provides the framework for our nation's strategic security environment. Three primary documents, the NSS, the NMS, and the NDS, along with supporting documents provide strategic guidance to our nation's military leaders. Charged with oversight of a geographical region of the world, the CCDRs develop plans and activities to interact with other U.S. government agencies and foreign nations within their regions in order to achieve the nation's strategic objectives. As they develop their ways of accomplishing these ends, the CCDRs develop plans and activities for a variety of engagements, ranging from peacetime cooperation to post-conflict to nation-rebuilding efforts. As a means of accomplishing peacetime activities designed to shape their regional strategic area in our interest, the CCDRs execute security cooperation activities. These activities focus on a wide range of events, from military contacts and training programs to humanitarian assistance activities and partnership for peace programs. To support the CCDRs, Army RC personnel participate in these activities as rotational and forward deployed forces.

In addition to developing engagement plans and activities, CCDR and service MACOM staffs identify incremental funding requirements to resource these programs. The costs associated with these activities generally come from OMA funding for Army active component event sponsors and P&A training funds for Army RC components. Typically, OMA funds support the personnel participating in the event. However, without adequate P&A funds that enable RC forces to participate in these activities, OMA funds may be of limited use. Whereas the active Army receives adequate funding for these engagement programs, the Army RCs' do not. The PPBE process used to present program funding requirements causes this inequity. Specifically, these problems are a

result of; Program Budget Decisions that reduced funding across unspecified programs without detailed guidance; A failure to adequately integrate measures of effectiveness of the engagement activities within the PPBE process; and Separation of funding requirements in different MDEPs within the POM process.

The solution to this problem requires the combined efforts of both the planners and programmers. First, planners must develop valid measures of effectiveness of these engagement activities in order to quantify program results. The programmers must then integrate these results as quantifiable measures into the PPBE automated database for program justification. Second, programmers must develop separate MDEPs for the CCDRs TSCP activities. These MDEPs must consolidate the total requirements of all security cooperation activities in separate MDEPs within the PPBE process. These MDEPs will then reflect the total incremental costs across all Army appropriations. Finally, Active and RC Army agencies must present a combined requirement in each of the CCDRs MDEPs in order to present the total OMA and P&A incremental costs associated with each peacetime engagement activity.

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